the-shelf (COTS)-based, high-performance devices. This paper will discuss that the above factors, coupled with the systems application environment, have a strong interplay that affect the radiation hardness of programmable devices and have resultant system impacts in (1) reliability of the unprogrammed, biased antifuse for heavy ions (rupture), [1] . Various "recipes" for these elements are explored and data is shown for a highspeed, radiation-hardened antifuse.
FPGAs, in particular, are now using some of the most advanced technologies, scaling internal features and improving performance with some devices operating at lower core voltages.
We have seen what is probably the last generation of 5 V devices being produced at their limit of 0.45 p,m, the 40MX and 42MX series. All of the major manufacturers have deep sub-micron devices, generally in the 0.35 _tm technology, some with 0.25 gm features, running at a 3.3 V core voltage.
The state-of-the-art is the announced 0.18 9m device from Vantis (AMD), the VF1 series; this device runs at a core voltage of 2.5 VDC.
The lower core voltages are attractive to system designers because of their high speed and lower power consumption, power being a function of V 2. The effects on the SEU and total dose characteristics are studied and are relatively consistent across manufacturers and foundries. Note however, that these advanced devices, to be usable in practical systems, retain an input tolerance of 5.5 volts, a concern for gate rupture in these deep sub-micron processes, requiring special circuit structures to prevent breakdown and conduction to the VOD rail. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19990009387 2019-12-26T16:08:44+00:00Z !................ ............... _:_ __ _,:_ _ _::_ :_ ,:_ _: _ _:: _:__: _ _ ::_ _ _: _:_::_: :_:_:_ _:_ __:: _i_?__!_!:_! i;_ :ii:_ _ _:i_;:i_i: _i_i_i_i_i_ !_ii_!!iii_ii_i_!ii_!_iiiii_i_!!i_!_iii_!i!!_!!!ii_!i!i_!i!_i_i!_i_iii!!_iiii!_! Pre-Print to be published in the IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, December, 1998 II. RUPTURE substrates program at approximately 30 VDC supporting
A. Oxide Nitride Oxide (ONO) Antifuses
The ONO antifuse is frequently used in non-volatile space flight applications.
Biased, unprogrammed antifuses are susceptible to heavy ion-induced rupture and improvements have been made in antifuse design [1] . Recent testing has augmented our data set for the hardened antifuse in the RH1020, with the production devices' antifuses having a 90 A thickness.
Results are shown in Figure 1 . The beam was normal to the die, worst-case, and a fluence of 107 ions/cm 2 used for each run. A significant positive margin exists above a bias voltage of 5.5 VDC at an LET of 37 MeV-cm2/mg. This is adequate for most missions and the antifuse can be classified as radiation-tolerant;
it has improved radiation performance over its commercial ancestors.
--_>__ 5ţ
fi "_4- Figure 1 . Summary of antifuse rupture data. Positive margin at LET= 37 MeV-cm2/mg is shown for production RH1020 with a hardened ONO antifuse. One "recipe" of an M2M antifuse did not fail at LET=82 MeV-em2/mg, Vr_tAs = 400 mV.
B. Metal-to-Metal (M2M) Antifuses
Metal-to-metal antifuses hold performance advantages over the ONO version; programmed resistance's are -25-50 ohms versus~100-500 ohins for FPGA implementations. M2M antifuse resistance is < 1 ohm for the less densitycritical programmable substrates. These devices are enabled by advances in processing technologies that are critical for controlling the thickness of the programmable elements. References [1] [2] [3] discuss their hardness to total dose effects.
While ONO antifuse thickness is of the order of 100 A, M2M antifuse thickness typically varies from 500 A to I000 A, resulting in a decreased electric field strength of a factor of 5 to 10, assuming equal bias voltages.
This assumption is not valid for current devices. Programmable analog supply voltages of + 12VDC; careful routing ensures that no antifuse sees more than a 12 VDC bias. Recent M2M antifuse FPGAs operate at lower voltages, further decreasing the electric field strength in the biased antifuse by 35%. Reliability studies conducted on M2M antifuses [2, 4, 5] show MTBF as a function of bias voltage.
Antifuse rupture data is a function of heavy ion LET and electric field strength [1] and the failure points of some of the amorphous silicon antifuses occur at a far lower electric field strength than either the ONO antifuses or the SiO2 reference data [6] , Failure analysis, using several different techniques, has been conducted, assisting in the determination of failure and investigation of the mechanisms.
Emission microscope techniques have proven successful for ONO antifuse and a liquid crystal methodology for a variety of M2M damaged antifuses.
In addition, current-voltage curves for damaged antifuses vary by construction.
To expand on our results, a next generation DUT card has been built with new devices designed and fabricated for M2M antifuses. Devices that have been tested include the QL3025, prototype A54SX16, RT54SX16, and the RH54SX16's, and the UT22VP10. The QL3025 is a 3.3 V, 0.35 _tm device fabricated at TSMC.
Each of the SX prototypes uses a different antifuse "recipe" for these experiments. The A54SX16 is also a 3.3 V, 0.35 _m device while the RT54SX16 and the RH54SX16 are both 3.3 V, 0.6 p.m devices. These devices all have 5 volt-tolerant I/O, supported by a 5 V bias, and have a 3.3 V core. The UT22VP10 is a 5 V PAL; the test data for this device was inconclusive and will not be discussed in this paper. The QL3025 had significant latchup problems, preventing an analysis of their antifuse structure.
Results for the three SX M2M antifuse prototypes is shown in Figure 1 where the bottom reference line is set at 3.6 volts, the maximum rated voltage for this technology. At a LET of 37MeV-cm2/mg, all of the devices showed significant positive margins, with no damage detected, giving SEU-tolerant performance.
At the higher LETs, differences are observed between the three variants, with two of the devices failing at an LET of 45 MeV-cm2/mg. The significant result is the performance of "recipe M." Several lots were tested, showing radiation-hard performance, no damage at an LET of 82 MeV-cm2/mg. Additional margin for this design was demonstrated by increasing the bias voltage to 4.0 VDC, 11% greater than the rated maximum. Further experiments are planned which will test the effects of different variants of the recipes to give further insight into the mechanism.
Testing techniques are similar for the ONO and M2M antifuses although damage to the M2M-based structures are far easier to detect. These structures, designed for lower programmed impedances, also have lower impedances when damaged by a heavy ion. Despite the higher bias across the ONO structure, the current draw by a damaged M2M structure is many times higher.
III. LOGIC UPSET C. Rtt1020 Logic Upset Analysis and Mitigation A. Introduction
Logic upset is s a transient pulse from a single ion strike.
This can occur in combinational circuits or global resources such as clock and reset lines. Previously, logic upset was observed in an FPGA but cross-sections were not determined.
B. Logic Upset Examples and Instrumentation
Gate upsets in the RH1280 were observed when running at a reduced supply voltage of 3.3 VDC + 10%; there were no logic upsets when running at supply voltages > 4.5 VDC.
Failures occurred in the voter circuits of TMR strings and correlation with on-chip error monitors confirmed logic upset. This is an example of a data upset, with the glitch or runt pulse arriving at the input to the flip-flop during the critical time when the data is latched, typically a small fraction of a nanosecond.
There was no effort to harden the logic circuits of the RH1280, originally a commercial design. Figure 3 .
The clock upset cross-section
in pre-production models of the RH1020 is significantly higher than that of it's commercial cousin, the AI020B (1.0 _tm device). This is thought to be attributed to moving the design to the higher performance radiation-hardened process, where small runt pulses propagate easier and flip-flops respond to signals with a smaller pulse width and amplitude [7] . shorts the outputs of the buffers together to minimize clock skew, resulting in many common points to the distribution network. The earlier A1020 (2.0 _m) and A1020A (1.2 rtm) devices had isolated row buffers and similar error signatures indicated that the upsets were present in the input stage, not in one of the clock row drivers.
A number of analytical and experimental techniques such as laser stimulation and using a focused ion beam (FIB) to perform circuit modifications
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Analysis of transistor sizes and clock upset cross-sections
led to the preliminary conclusion that the upset was happening on the clock's transition. Several experiments were run to verify this. During heavy ion irradiation, the input was held at either rail, with few clock upsets detected with the clock input grounded. This dependence is consistent with transistor-level circuit analysis, which showed a strong asymmetry, typical of TTL-level inputs, and laboratory noise testing on the input stage.
This conclusion was confirmed with heavy ion irradiation by measuring the frequency dependence of the upset as shown in Figure 4 , with four devices tested from 10 kHz to 1 MHz, each run having a fluence of 10 7 ions/cm 2. The large part-to-part variation in Clock Frequency (Hz) Figure 4 . RH1020 (pre-production devices) input buffer transients resulting in "clock upsets." The upset occurs on the transition and is shown here as a frequency dependence While this phenomenon has been referred to as "clock upset," we refer to it in the more general sense as "logic upset." An examination of the schematics for non-dedicated While the cross-section of the original devices was low, approximately 10 .6 cm2/Clock, the modifications resulted in a reduction by an order of magnitude. Figure 5 shows the results, plotting both typical pre-production data vs. an average of five production devices.
Clock upset was also detected in the A1020, A1020A, A1020B, and CX2041 microcircuits. Figure 5 . Clock upset performance of pre-production and production RH1020 devices.
The production devices had a modified input circuit for improved SEE performance
IV. CONFIGURATION UPSET

A. Introduction
For many types of microcircuits, the mode and the control of the chip may be configured in a variety of ways. A representative run showing one class of error signatures is shown in Figure 6 . A 5 V bias is used for 5 volttolerant I/O and a 3.3 V bias powers the array core and output drivers. Large currents were observed and remained until the device's power was cycled.
In some cases, the current draw exceeded 800 mA, the programmed setting for the power supply. Although this current rise is often a result of SEL, no determination was immediately made.
Similar results were seen on devices from several foundries and the device irradiated in Figure 6 was from a radiation-hardened line using a 2 _tm epitaxial layer. The design rules for the device were consistent with good latchup performance and the small failure cross-section suggested a different mechanism. Other failure signatures were observed, again with an apparent loss of functionality.
One class shows the current levels dropping from their active state to quiescent levels. Figure 6 . Strip chart during irradiation of a prototype FPGA produced on a radiation-hardened, 2 grn epi line. The current on some runs exceeded 800mA and was caused by a configuration error from an SEU in the 1149.1 TAP controller. The test access port (TAP) controller commands the test interface and registers with a sixteen-state sequencer. Figure   8 shows a simplified diagram of the basic configuration as it is typically implemented, without the hard reset pin (TRST!, which is optional in the standard), along with the instruction register.
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The output of the instruction register controls the device and consists of two sections, a shift register for serial loading and a parallel latch to hold the instruction, which is loaded and cleared on command from the TAP controller. Analysis of the state assignment used in the prototype devices tested showed that a single bit error could force sequencing through the Update-IR state.
Note in Figure 8 that the shift register located in the instruction register is not held in reset when the TAP 
A. Heavy Ion and Proton Induced SEU 1) Heavy 1on Effects and Analysis
The RH1020, which is based on the A1020B commercial design, has recently been characterized for SEU performance. Figure 11 .
Lastly, as seen in Table 1 , no upsets were detected for QYH530 ASICs, with devices selected from two one-mask production lots. The devices in this test configuration were operated at 3.3 volts.
3) SI_-IM Configuration
Memory Analysis [12] , qualification testing on the RH1020 5 p.m epi process showed no sign of latchup and excellent total dose performance.
SRAM-based
Based on the susceptibility of the ONO antifuse to rupture as a result of heavy ions [12] , the antifuse thickness in the RH series was changed, decreasing the electric field strength which provides a more radiation-tolerant solution.
Section III discussed the vulnerability of the RH1020's input buffer to single event transients and the improvements gained by redesigning the circuits.
No effort was made to harden the storage elements with SEU performance ranging from low tolerance to "rad-tolerant" levels. 
B. CGaAs CLAy-IO
E. R TSX and RHSX
These 0.6 rtm devices are based on the commercial A54SX series and have had prototypes tested over the past two years. RTSX prototypes are produced at MEC and RHSX prototypes are "fabricated at LMFS.
As discussed in Section
Pre-Print to be published in the IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, December, 1998 V, total dose hardness for the RTSX can be made greater than 100krads (Si) and the RHSX prototype easily passes 200 krads (Si) [1] . A radiation-hardened antifuse structure has been demonstrated passing tests at a LET of 82.3 MeV-cm2/mg. Present design modifications include the addition of the optional TRST! line to harden the IEEE JTAG 1149.1 TAP controller and a modified hard-wired flip-flop to increase SEU hardness from radiation-tolerant levels to radiation-hard.
This device operates with a 3.3 VDC core and is 5 V-input tolerant.
VII. CONCLUSION
Programmable devices will continue to be of increasing importance to spacecraft electronics designers as system requirements increase the trend towards higher performance electronics with increased processing bandwidth and shorter development times. These devices will be required for onboard processing of the increasing data volumes from sensors that cannot be accommodated by typical data storage and compression schemes with the available down link telemetry rates.
State-of-the-art, commercial programmable devices have recently progressed rapidly down the technology curve, with operating frequencies rivaling that of high-powered discrete designs and ASICs, in many cases.
Programmable devices can be either custom-designed for space applications or rely on commercial technology and its associated infrastructure.
While most programmable devices for space flight are derivatives of commercial designs, the LMFS PROM was designed with radiation issues in mind utilizing a low (0.1 V) bias across unprogrammed ONO antifuses to ensure high-reliability.
Commercially-derived devices' radiation tolerance range from poor to radiation-tolerant, in most cases. Some of the radiation hazards stem from structures and technologies that are perfectly reliable in the conunercial/military sector, such as antifuses, TTL-compatible input buffers, flip-flop designs, and circuits such as the JTAG TAP controller, as examples. Total dose performance of 5.0 VDC devices is highly variable, subject to process variations at the commercial foundries.
We have shown that devices' radiation performance levels can be increased to radiation-hard levels without the use of an expensive radiation-hard process. This is through a combination of modification of circuit designs and commercial processes.
Examples include a radiationhardened antifuse and total dose performance greater than 100 krads (Si). A number of manufacturers are now actively modifying their designs and their foundries' processes to increase the radiation performance of commercially produced devices Within the next few years, the commercially produced, modified devices will likely provide solid radiation performance for the majority of applications, including highspeed processing.
Similarly designed devices, produced on traditional radiation-hardened lines, will be available for high levels of radiation performance. 
